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SAN-102 · Free
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SAN-102

Data at Risk

  1. 01 · Data lifecycle
  2. 02 · Leakage pathways
  3. 03 · Injection & exfil
  4. 04 · Governance & law
  5. 05 · Controls & audit
  6. Knowledge check

0 / 6 complete

Module 01

How AI Models Handle Your Data

The data lifecycle end to end — prompts, retention, and deployment tiers.

What you will cover

  • The anatomy of an AI interaction: prompts, system prompts, context windows, retrieval augmentation, tool calls
  • Where your data goes: provider logging, retention windows, abuse-prevention review, human evaluation queues, telemetry
  • Deployment tiers and what they actually guarantee: consumer apps, enterprise APIs, private endpoints, local and open-weight models
  • Training on your data: when it happens, when it contractually cannot, and what “we don’t train on your data” does and doesn’t cover
  • Model memorisation and training-data extraction: what research has demonstrated, what it means for fine-tunes

Practice prompt

Map the journey of one real prompt (sanitised) through a consumer app, an enterprise API and a local model — identify every copy made and every party that can read it.

Human factors lens: the “chat illusion” — why a private-feeling conversational interface suppresses the mental model of data leaving a boundary, and how to rebuild that boundary instinct.

Module 02

Leakage Pathways: Prompts, Shadow AI & RAG

How data actually escapes — direct disclosure, unsanctioned tools, and over-permissioned retrieval.

What you will cover

  • Direct disclosure: sensitive data in prompts — client identifiers, credentials in logs, vulnerability details, personal data
  • Shadow AI: unsanctioned tools, personal accounts, browser extensions, AI features silently enabled in existing SaaS
  • Agent tool-chains: how a single instruction fans out across email, tickets, code repos and browsers
  • RAG over-permissioning: assistants that retrieve documents the user could never open directly
  • Case reviews: public incidents of source-code and personal-data leakage via AI tools

Practice prompt

Inventory a fictional SOC’s real AI usage from network, expense and browser artefacts — then score each path’s risk. Note where bans would fail and where sanctioned fast paths would help.

Human factors lens: shadow AI as a rational response to friction — why bans fail, and how sanctioned fast paths plus classification habits beat policy alone.

Module 03

Adversarial Data Risks: Injection & Exfiltration

When someone else wants your data — indirect prompt injection and exfil channels.

What you will cover

  • Direct vs. indirect prompt injection: malicious instructions smuggled in web pages, emails, tickets, documents and code
  • Exfiltration mechanics: tool-call abuse, markdown/link tricks, DNS and image-beacon channels, agent-to-agent spread
  • Data poisoning and RAG poisoning: corrupting the knowledge an assistant retrieves and acts on
  • AI supply chain: models, datasets, plugins and MCP servers as attack surface
  • Defensive patterns: untrusted-content handling, least-privilege tools, egress allow-lists, human-in-the-loop gates

Practice prompt

Design a workflow where an AI SOC assistant reads tickets. List three injection/exfil channels an attacker could use, then name one architectural control that breaks each channel.

Human factors lens: authority by fluency — why well-formatted model output disarms the suspicion that a raw log line would trigger.

Module 04

Governance, Law & Client Confidentiality

The accountable layer — UK GDPR, AI Act awareness, ISO mapping, and vendor diligence.

What you will cover

  • UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act applied to AI use: lawful basis, minimisation, processor terms, transfers, DPIAs
  • EU AI Act awareness: what touches security teams in practice; UK regulatory direction
  • ISO/IEC 42001 and ISO/IEC 27001: where AI data controls slot into an existing ISMS; NIST AI RMF as a checklist
  • Client confidentiality under CREST member-company obligations when AI assists
  • Vendor due diligence: training-use terms, retention, subprocessors, residency, enterprise vs. consumer APIs

Practice prompt

Draft a one-page DPIA skeleton and a five-question vendor scorecard for “LLM assistant for incident report drafting”.

Human factors lens: accountability diffusion — when “the AI did it” becomes acceptable, governance has already failed.

Module 05

Controls, Architecture & Capstone Audit

Building the defensible workflow — classification, redaction, and usable policy.

What you will cover

  • Data classification for AI: public / internal / client / evidential mapped to allowed model tiers
  • Redaction and pseudonymisation patterns that preserve analytical value
  • Technical controls: DLP for AI endpoints, CASB/proxy patterns, egress allow-lists, permission-aware retrieval, private endpoints
  • Writing an AI acceptable-use policy people actually follow, with sanctioned fast paths
  • Monitoring and audit: logging AI usage without surveilling the workforce

Capstone prompt (self-paced)

Audit a fictional AI-assisted SOC workflow: map every data flow, find planted risks (shadow AI, over-permissioned RAG, injection path, unlawful transfer), and write a prioritised remediation plan with a one-page policy.

Human factors lens: controls people route around are controls that don’t exist — design for the analyst on their worst, busiest day.

Assessment

Knowledge check

Four scenario questions from the SAN-102 item bank. Learning feedback only — not a formal certification exam.

Q1. An analyst pastes a client’s subnet ranges and three vulnerability descriptions into a consumer LLM app to speed up report drafting. The primary problem is:

Accuracy is a SAN-101 problem; this is a custody problem. Consumer-tier apps may log, retain, human-review and train on prompts. (Module 2)

Q2. Your AI SOC assistant summarises incoming tickets. A ticket contains hidden instructions telling the assistant to forward case details to an external address. This is:

Indirect prompt injection is the defining adversarial data risk of tool-connected AI. Defence is architectural plus behavioural. (Module 3)

Q3. A RAG assistant deployed over the company document store answers a junior analyst with content from HR disciplinary files. The most likely root cause is:

Permission-aware retrieval — enforcing source-system ACLs at query time — is the control. (Module 2 & 5)

Q4. Under UK GDPR, sending personal data to a third-party AI API for processing is lawful when:

Compliance is a set of verifiable conditions, not a vendor claim. (Module 4)

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Free online edition for individual learning. Not CPD-accredited. Not (ISC)² accredited. Not a substitute for instructor-led delivery.

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